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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2009 marked two events of interest to those with an interest
in lunar exploration. First, there was the discovery by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) of large quantities of water
on the moon.' Second, there was the release of Duncan Jones' film
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October 23, 2010. The author thanks his fellow panelists Henry Hertzfeld and Rafael Moro Aguilar for
their comments and insights during that session, as well as Gunjan Sharma, Associate of Skadden, Arps,
for his help in finalizing this article.
1. "NASA scientists discovered that the moon contains water, a 'significant amount,' said
Anthony Colaprete, who oversaw the Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite mission. He said
NASA found enough water to fill a dozen two gallon buckets." Ashley Jones, There's Water on the
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"Moon," which imagines a future where large quantities of Helium-3 are
harvested and sent back to earth to be used in clean nuclear fusion, solving
the world's energy and environmental problems-but requiring Sam
Rockwell's character, the solitary miner, to work under somewhat
inequitable conditions imposed by his employer, Lunar Industries.
Science-fiction aside, if outer space resources are exploited in the
future, it seems quite likely that private companies will be involved in the
endeavor. This is not to suggest an unregulated "Wild West" of the kind
encountered in films like "Outland" or a dystopian future of the kind shown
in the film "Moon;" but the fact remains that, for the last few decades,
private capital has driven most forms of technological innovation and large-
scale investment, and, even after the 2008 financial crisis, continues to play
a leading role in the world's economic development. Suggested below are
a few ideas on how the current legal instruments concerning lunar
exploration can be improved to encourage private enterprise in this field.
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE MOON AGREEMENT
A. Genesis of the Moon Agreement
The Moon Agreement of 1979 (Moon Agreement)2 is the last in the
initial series of Space Law treaties, of which the 1967 Outer Space Treaty 3
is perhaps the high-water mark. The Moon Agreement applies not only to
Moon, but Who Owns It?, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Nov. 18, 2009), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/
2009/11/18/theres-water-on-the-moon-but-who-owns-it/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
2. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
G.A. Res. 34/68, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/68 (Dec. 5, 1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1434 (1979)
[hereinafter Moon Agreement].
3. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, entered into force for the United States,
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967), available at
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/STSPACEIIE.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2001) [hereinafter
Outer Space Treaty]. 98 States have ratified, and an additional 27 have signed, the Outer Space Treaty
(as of Jan. 1, 2008). It provides the basic ground rules for space law, including that:
(1) Space exploration shall be carried out for the benefit of all mankind, in
recognition that space is "the province of all mankind;"
(2) Outer space is not to be weaponized;
(3) Outer space cannot be the subject of sovereign claims;
(4) States shall have "responsibility" for their space activities (including the
activities of non-governmental actors who are nationals of those states);
and
(5) The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes.
Id.
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the Moon itself, whose riches are vast enough, but to "other celestial
bodies;" thus, potentially covering the planets and asteroids, whose mineral
potential is almost infinite.' Despite its ambitious spatial coverage, many of
the provisions of the Moon Agreement do no more than restate the 1967
principles as being applicable to "the moon and other celestial bodies,'6 or
contain similarly anodyne statements about freedom of research and
7
exploration or the absence of national sovereignty over outer space.
B. The Hostile Reception
One of the apparent driving factors for its rapid finalization and
adoption in 1979 was the anxiety of Soviet Bloc states over the
4. Standing alone, the value of the water on the Moon is considerable as it might sustain a
future human community there. "For future lunar colonists, this lunar water is more precious than
gold." Kevin V. Cook, The Discovery of Lunar Water: An Opportunity to Develop a Workable Moon
Treaty, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVT'L L. REv. 647, 651 (1999). The H-3 deposits are "potentially [even] more
valuable." Id. at 652.
5. The Moon, planets and asteroids have been said to contain "aluminum, calcium, carbon,
chromium, gold, hydrogen, iridium, iron, magnesium, manganese, nickel, nitrogen, oxygen, platinum,
silicon, titanium and water." Heidi Keefe, Making the Final Frontier Feasible: A Critical Look at the
Current Body of Outer Space Law, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 345, 362 (1995).
One asteroid alone is said to contain approximately $1 trillion worth of iron, nickel, cobalt and platinum.
See Cook, supra note 4, at 653. In terms of its sheer physical scope, therefore, the Moon Agreement
could rightly be characterized as "the most far reaching international agreement ever written." Art Dula,
Free Enterprise & The Proposed Moon Treaty, 2 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 3, 3 (1980).
6. For example, Article 2 of the Moon Agreement, providing that "[o]uter space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by
means of use or occupation, or by any other means," simply reaffirms Article II of the Outer Space
Treaty. The provisions guaranteeing against militarization of the Moon or celestial bodies likewise
mirror Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty. See also Dula, supra note 5 at 6 n.14 (summarizing the
provisions of the 1967 Treaty that mention the Moon).
7. Article 11(2) of the Moon Agreement, stating that "[t]he moon is not subject to national
appropriation by any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means,"
simply elaborates on the principle stated in the Outer Space Treaty that outer space cannot be the subject
of national sovereign claims. Indeed, the non-sovereignty principle is broadly in line with the Law of
the Sea Convention's principle that "[n]o State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights
over any part of the [sea-bed]." United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 137(1), Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter LOSC]. The non-sovereignty principle also lines up with the
current "freeze" or exercise on territorial claims over the Antarctic. See Antarctic Treaty, art. 4(2), Dec.
1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (providing that the state parties shall not make any new claim
to sovereignty over Antarctica). Article 11(3) of the Moon Agreement, providing that the landing of
space vehicles or building of installations on the Moon shall not give rise to ownership rights "over the
surface or the subsurface of the moon or any areas thereof," is reasonably consistent with the non-
sovereignty principle-although it is perhaps disappointing that the Moon Agreement does not afford
assurances that future owner/operator of those "buildings and installations" has the right to continuous
use, occupation and enjoyment of those facilities.
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militarization of space. Those anxieties were partially assuaged by the
provisions of Article 3, which "reaffirmed the demilitarization of the moon
and [celestial] bodies."8 When Western critics examined its text, however,
it was not these provisions, but instead the economic provisions, that
sparked controversy. Specifically, Article 11(1) of the Moon Agreement,
stating that the natural resources of the Moon were the "common heritage
of mankind,"9 was seen as a road to the socialization of the Moon.
There is an irony here. The formula "common heritage of all
mankind" was not, as is commonly supposed, a creation of the Soviet Bloc;
rather it was devised by Argentinian lawyers who believed, perhaps
reasonably, that the prior formula "province of all mankind" was unduly
vague and that a new formula was needed to reflect the concepts of
"beneficial domain which includes enjoyment, profit and receipt of
fruits." 0 This formula then was embraced by the Nixon administration in
1972," over the strong opposition of the Soviet Bloc.12 Small wonder that
the chief U.S. negotiator expressed bewilderment when the phrase came
under attack.13
8. BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 362 (Clarendon Press 1997) (noting
that, although "it can only be a matter for speculation what supplied the political will" for the
"seemingly barren and frustrating labour of seven years [of Moon Agreement negotiations] suddenly to
bloom and fruit all within the span of fifteen days," the "answer" may be found in the fact that the
second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-ll) was finalized at almost exactly the same time).
9. Article 11(1) provides that "[t]he moon and its natural resources are the common heritage
of mankind, which finds its expression in the provisions of this Agreement, in particular in paragraph 5
of this article." See Moon Agreement, supra note 2, art. 11(1).
10. Maureen Williams, The Common Heritage of Mankind and the Moon Agreement:
Economic Implications and Institutional Arrangements, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 24TH COLLOQUIUM ON
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 87 (Int'l Inst. of Space Law, Sept. 1981).
11. See generally Carl Q. Christol, The Common Heritage of Mankind Provision in the 1979
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 14 INT'L LAW.
429, 454-65 (1980) (describing development of "common heritage of mankind" principle during treaty
negotiations).
12. "Until July of 1979, the Soviet Union maintained strong opposition to the common
heritage concept, and it was essentially because of this opposition that the [Moon] Treaty was not
concluded several years [before 1979]." Marian L. Nash, U.S. Practice, 74 AM. J. INT'L .L. 418, 423
(1980) (quoting then Secretary Cyrus R. Vance). Instead, the Soviet Union preferred the view that
space was "an international area for common use, 'a position that has been described as' just a watered
down version of res nullius" that necessarily "rejected any limitation on their use of space resources."
David Everett Marko, A Kind, Gentler Moon Treaty: A Critical Review of the Current Moon Treaty and
a Proposed Alternative, 8 J. NAT. RES. & ENvT'L L. 293, 312 (1992-93).
13. See, e.g., International Space Activities, 1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Space
Science & Applications of the H. Comm. on Science & Technology, 96th Cong., 95-96 (1979)
(statement of S. Neil Hosenball, U.S. Representative to the 1979 Session at the U.N. Comm. on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Admin.) [hereinafter
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No matter, over time the notion that certain resources (such as the
moon, or the deep sea-bed, or the Antarctic) are the "common heritage of
mankind" was aggressively embraced by developing nations, 14 and thus
came to acquire socialist connotations." It did not matter that the phrase
itself was relatively benign, if not meaningless; politics abhors a vacuum
and it was soon given a meaning. Specifically, "[t]he developing nations
interpret[ed the concept] to embody the principle that celestial body
resources are the common property of all the nations, and to require
international control of celestial body resources for the purpose of
redistributing wealth and technology among nations."' 6  This was in
diametrical opposition to the supposedly "laissez faire" interpretation that
the United States had previously advanced.'7
House Subcommittee Hearings]. "I don't think that [the 'common heritage of mankind'] is a defined
term, and I think people are overly concerned with the definition." See Nash, supra note 12, at 425
(quoting then Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations J. Brian Atwood as stating that
"neither the 'common heritage of mankind' concept as embodied in the Moon Treaty nor any other
provision of the Treaty compels any specific form of international arrangement for the regulation of the
exploitation of moon or other celestial body resources").
14. The movement to treat Antarctica as part of the "common heritage of mankind" began
with a proposal by Malaysia in 1982, and gained traction during the 1980s among members of the so-
called "non-aligned movement" and "Group of 77" developing nations. See Moritaka Hayashi, The
Antarctica Question in the United Nations, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 275, 275-76 (1986). Some of its
proponents argued that the "common heritage" concept required a "sharing of benefits by all mankind"
of resources extracted from Antarctica. See id. at 287-88. The "common heritage" question, insofar as
Antarctica was concerned, receded greatly in 1991, when the Antarctic Treaty System members agreed
on a long-term moratorium on mining in the Antarctic.
15. See Marko, supra note 12, at 310 (The developing states "h[eld] the notion that the Moon
is common property, res communis, and that taking property declared to be the common heritage of
mankind is stealing.") (footnotes omitted).
16. Alan Duane Webber, Note, Extraterritorial Law on the Final Frontier: A Regime to
Govern the Development of Celestial Body Resources, 71 Geo. L.J. 1427, 1436-37 (1983) (footnote
omitted); see also id. at 1445 ("The Moon Treaty, like [Part XI of LOSC], will probably be interpreted
as requiring developers to share their profits and technology with the lesser-developed countries.");
House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 13, at 134 (statement of Marmes A. Dubs, Chairman,
American Mining Congress Committee on Undersea Mineral Resources) (The common heritage concept
represents a system where there is "complete international control over access to, and the disposition of
important natural resources so as to effect the transfer of wealth, technology and political control from
the industrialized countries to the developing countries.").
17. Webber, supra note 16, at 1437. The United States position, of course, always
presupposed a degree of regulation: as formulated by President Nixon during the sea-bed negotiations,
it envisaged "that all resources in the deep seabed should be regarded as the common heritage of
mankind, to be held in trust by the adjacent coastal state, with the revenues of the trusteeship to be
apportioned between the trustee and an international seabed authority." Grier C. Raclin, From Ice to
Ether: The Adoption ofa Regime to Govern Resource Exploitation in Outer Space, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 727, 738 (1986).
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To be sure, the Moon Treaty does not prohibit (and thus implicitly
permits) private lunar exploration. Moreover, it does not expressly ban the
use of lunar minerals for profit, and it allows private actors "to keep title to
any private property which they might bring to the moon."s But this
implicit acceptance of private lunar exploration was subject to a proposed,
yet-to-be-established "international regime" to "govern the exploitation of
the natural resources of the moon as such exploitation is about to become
feasible."19 And, while some of the stated principles of the future regime
(such as "orderly and safe development of the natural resources of the
moon," and the "rational management" of the moon and the "expansion" of
exploitation) were unobjectionable, the last of the regime goals proved
controversial. It stated that this regime would seek to bring about:
An equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits derived
from those resources, whereby the interests and needs of the
developing countries, as well as the efforts of those countries
which have contributed either directly or indirectly to the
exploration of the Moon, shall be given special consideration.20
Opponents predicted that this new authority would likely be a body in
which developed countries would potentially be outnumbered and outvoted;
and therefore, as a body predominantly controlled by developing countries,
this new authority would insist on technology transfer and payment of
international taxes as part of the new "regime" of lunar exploration.21
Compounding this all was that the "regime" was only to emerge after
it had been determined that exploitation of lunar resources was proven to be
18. Brian M. Hoffstadt, Moving the Heavens: Lunar Mining & the "Common Heritage of
Mankind, " in the Moon Treaty, 42 UCLA L. REv. 575, 586 (1994). Mr. Hoffstadt also suggests that
"the Treaty grants ownership to any natural resources on the moon's surface that are no longer in place"
and might therefore permit retention of profit from "minerals which are mined" there. Id. He stresses,
however, that these features need to be read in conjunction with the rules regarding an international
"regime," which might have the ability to regulate and prohibit such mining activities through "ex post
facto restrictions on mining and profit-keeping." Id. at 590.
19. Moon Agreement, supra note 2, art. 11(5); see also id. art. 11(6) ("In order to facilitate the
establishment of the international regime . . . States Parties shall inform the Secretary-General of the
United Nations as well as the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent
feasible and practicable, of any natural resources they may discover on the Moon."); id. art. 18 (This
article provides that, at any time after the fifth anniversary of the agreement coming into force, there
shall be a "review conference" to "consider the question of the implementation" of the international
regime.). The projected "review conference" apparently has not occurred.
20. Id. art. 11(7); see also id. art. 11(8) ("All the activities with respect to the natural resources
of the Moon shall be carried out in a manner compatible with the purposes specified in paragraph 7 of
this article and the provisions of article 6, paragraph 2, of this Agreement.").
21. See Cook, supra note 4, at 667.
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"feasible." 22 This awkward timing meant that an international authority
would impose its rules "in the middle of the figurative game," i.e., after
potentially expensive feasibility studies had been conducted.23 Combined
with the politically ambiguous nature of the "regime," this created the
specter of a private actor, having spent millions (or billions) on research on
exploration and prospecting, suffering "'ex post facto' appropriation of
their investments by a nebulous future international regime" with power to
tax or veto any future exploitation of the very resources the private actor
had just located.24
C. Comparisons with UNCLOS III's Sea-Bed Regime
Moon Agreement critics could point to the law of the sea for a
concrete example of how a "regime" based on "common heritage" might
work in practice. Throughout the 1970s, the United Nations Third
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was drafting a new Law
of the Sea Convention. A Sea-Bed Committee was responsible for drafting
an entire chapter of the new treaty to regulate the exploitation of the deep
sea-bed.25
In 1978, a draft of the proposed Law of the Sea Convention was
released, including a Part XI drafted by the Sea-Bed Committee. As
proposed (and as later adopted by the final 1982 session of UNCLOS III),
this text declared the sea-bed to be "the common heritage of mankind."26
By now, some delegates had definite views on what this meant. To quote
Sri Lanka's delegate, "[i]f you touch the nodules at the bottom of the sea,
you touch my property. If you take them away, you take away my
property."27 And, as "operationally defined" by the originally-drafted
UNCLOS Convention, "[common heritage of mankind] mean[t] that all
nations [were] entitled to share in the profits derived from sea-bed
22. Moon Agreement, supra note 2, art. 11(5).
23. Benjamin D. Hatch, Dividing the Pie in the Sky: The Need for a New Lunar Resources
Regime, 24 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 229, 252 (2010).
24. D. Goedhuis, Some Recent Trends in the Interpretation and the Implementation of the
Rules of International Space Law, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213, 232 (1981) (citing arguments
being made by "opponents of the present Moon regime").
25. See EDWARD L. MILES, GLOBAL OCEAN POLITICS: THE DECISION PROCESS AT THE THIRD
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1973-1982, 45-48 (1988).
26. LOSC, supra note 7, art. 136.
27. Statement of Ambassador M.C.W. Pinto of Sri Lanka, Alternatives in Mining, LAW OF THE
SEA INSTITUTE (Workshop at the Univ. of Hawaii, Dec. 11-14, 1978), reprinted in FABIO TRONCHETTI,
THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES-A
PROPOSAL FOR A LEGAL REGIME 57 (F.G. von der Dunk ed., vol. 4, 2009).
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resources, regardless of their contribution of capital or technology to the
extraction of those resources."28
Part XI as proposed in 1978 provided for the establishment of an
International Sea-Bed Authority (ISB Authority) to regulate and authorize
exploitation of minerals on the international sea-bed, and to collect and
distribute royalties from this activity. The ISB Authority had the power to
license private operators to engage in sea-bed mining as long as:
(1) Private operators pay a series of application fees and
royalties to the Authority;
(2) There be established an "Enterprise," to operate as a
wholly-owned organ of the public Authority, which would
have equal access to the sea-bed and operate alongside
private operators; and
(3) Any private operator would be subject to mandatory
technology transfers, in that they would be forced to share
their proprietary technical information with the Authority
and the Enterprise.29
The ISB Authority was required to provide for the "equitable sharing" of
benefits from sea-bed mining and to show special consideration for the
interests of developing states.30
The 1978 draft text of the UNCLOS III attracted immediate opposition
from critics within the United States. They objected not only to the
economic structure of the Part XI regime (which they considered to be too
bureaucratic and unfriendly to private capital), but also pointed out that, as
drafted, the ISB Authority's "one-nation-one-vote" rule would mean that
"the developing countries and the Eastern Bloc" would have "control[led]
licenses to exploit and use the deep sea-bed resources."3 ' This, plus the
"expensive" licensing fees, "cumbersome" licensing procedures, and
ceilings on output, were said to "deter development of the oceans'
resources." 32
Fears that the Moon Agreement's regulatory "regime" might resemble
the Part XI sea-bed regime fueled its opponents' arguments.33 To quote
then-Congressman John Breaux:
28. Webber, supra note 16, at 1439.
29. See LOSC, supra note 7, arts. 140(2), 144(1), 160(2)(f)(i).
30. Id. art. 140(2).
31. Raclin, supra note 17, at 744; Webber, supra note 16, at 1439.
32. Marko, supra note 12, at 318.
33. See Kevin B. Walsh, Controversial Issues under Article A7 of the Moon Treaty, 6 ANNALS
AiR & SPACE. L. 489, 496 (1981).
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The long-term economic implications for the United States would
be extremely adverse, if the United States were to repeat in the
outer space context the mistakes committed with regard to the
deep sea-bed. . . . I believe that for the United States to accept the
kind of situation presaged by the draft Moon Treaty is to invite a
serious erosion of our international community.34
Other critics were even more explicit, seeing the Moon Agreement as
"socializing the moon."35
D. The Demise of the Moon Agreement
Defenders of the Moon Agreement argued that comparisons with the
sea-bed regime were misplaced, and that it would not necessarily serve as a
wealth-redistribution body. They stressed that the concept of "[e]quitable"
division (as stated in Article 11) was "not the same as 'equal,"' signifying
that private operators might still be able to operate profitably within the
future international regime. But the drafters of the Moon Agreement had
done themselves no favors. The treaty text had "fail[ed] to clarify the
vague requirements" of this future regime, thus allowing critics to interpret
it uncharitably.3 7
Defenders of the treaty also took umbrage at suggestions that the treaty
imposed a "moratorium" on lunar development. They were technically
correct, in that the Moon Agreement does not expressly place a legal
moratorium on exploitation of lunar resources. Nevertheless, as many
commentators note, it contained so many "ambiguities, significant
restrictions and future commitments," and therefore created such
34. House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 13, at 141 (statement of U.S. Rep. John
Breaux); see also Letter from Senators Frank Church & Jacob Javits to Secretary of State Cyrus R.
Vance (Oct. 30, 1979), reprinted in CiZEN ACTION FOR GLOBAL CHANGE: THE NEPTUNE GROUP AND
THE LAW OF THE SEA 124 (Syracuse Univ. Press) (1999) (stating that the "interpretation of the 'common
heritage' [in the Law of the Sea Convention] ... does not conform to the national interests of the United
States or other countries with free enterprise/free market economies" and repeating these concerns with
respect to the Moon Agreement).
35. J.M. Spectar, Elephants, Donkeys or Other Creatures? Presidential Election Cycles &
International Law of the Global Commons, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 975, 1031 (2000) (citation
omitted).
36. Williams, supra note 10, at 88.
37. Cook, supra note 4, at 667; see also Marko, supra note 12, at 315 (noting that, whatever
the content of the treaty itself, "[tihe commercial and psychological beliefs of developed countries have
doomed the treaty" by creating the expectation that it will be used for wealth-distribution).
2011] 401
402 ILSA Journal ofInternational & Comparative Law [Vol. 17:2
uncertainty, that no rational private actor would invest in this legal
climate. 8
In sum, the treaty had been "hastily and hence poorly put together" 39
and was easy prey for the new wave of free-enterprise critics who saw it as
embodying the kind of 1970s ideology they were determined to sweep
away.40 And it was these kinds of concerns, voiced during the Senate
hearings on the Moon Agreement, that led the Carter Administration to
consign it to inter-agency review, 4 1 and for the Reagan Administration to
abandon it.4 2 The Moon Agreement has since acquired only a handful of
ratifications.43
38. Walsh, supra note 33, at 496; see also D. Goedhuis, supra note 24, at 232 ("[O]pponents
of the present Moon regime ... further submitted that free enterprise institutions simply cannot make
significant investments in space where there is a threat of suit over treaty terms of 'ex post facto'
appropriation of their investments by a nebulous future international regime."); Webber, supra note 16,
at 1445 ("Private enterprise would not be likely to make large investments in extraterrestrial resource
development if it feared that once investments had made exploitation feasible an international regime
would take control and distribute a portion of the profits among all nations."); House Subcommittee
Hearings, supra note 13, at 108 (statement of Leigh S. Ratiner, on behalf of the L-5 Society) (arguing
that the Moon Treaty effectively imposed a "de facto moratorium on private enterprise use of [outer]
space in connection with the development of natural resources").
39. CHENG, supra note 8, at 357.
40. Dula, supra note 5, at 23 ("[T]he Moon Treaty is a dangerous and unnecessary
abandonment of the basic legal rights free enterprise will need to work effectively in space. [It]
introduces substantial uncertainty and risk for private sector investment in space ventures that would
exploit space resources for profit."); House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 13, at 107 (statement of
Leigh S. Ratiner on behalf of the L-5 Society) ("The moon treaty is a give away of unprecedented
proportions for which the U.S. obtains nothing in return.").
41. Spectar, supra note 35, at 1033 (describing the process by which the Carter administration
shelved the treaty).
42. The first Reagan Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, was among the more trenchant
opponents of the Moon Treaty. In 1979, as President of United Technologies he testified before
Congress that the common heritage concept was being used by developing countries to "gain control
over critical materials and to gain access as a matter of right to the technology needed to exploit them"
and that ratification therefore "would doom any private investment directed at space resource
exploration." House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 13, at 219-20 (statement of Alexander Haig,
President, United Technologies Corp., Inc.). As Secretary of State, Mr. Haig "presided ... over the
dismantling of American support for the Moon Treaty." Marko, supra note 12, at 312 n. 129.
43. As of today, only 13 States-Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Kazakhstan, Lebanon,
Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, and Uruguay-have ratified the
Moon Agreement. U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs, Status of Agreements Relating to Activities in
Outer Space as at January 1, 2008, U.N. Doc. ST/SPACE/ll/Re.2/Ad.l (2008), available at
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE1 IRev2_AddlE.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
In addition, France, Guatemala, India and Romania have signed it. Moreover, "[a]rguably, the
agreement should be given little weight as evidence of developing customary law, since, in contrast to
other 'space law' agreements that have achieved widespread ratification, the Moon Agreement has, over
Nelson
Looking back, it is difficult to disagree with Professor Goedhuis'
observation that the final text of the Moon Agreement should not have been
"rushed through the United Nations in a great hurry before a consensus on
the exact meaning and content of the concept of the moon and its natural
resources being the common heritage of mankind had been achieved.""
III. THE NEED FOR A REVISED TREATY REGIME
Assuming, as a policy matter, that private capital needs to be better
incentivized in the future of lunar resources development, what legal
reforms might assist this?
Some might advocate a totally unregulated environment where
operators take what they find. This has superficial attraction for those
concerned with the disincentives and "free riders" associated with the
common heritage concept.45 But, one critic has warned:
[Tihis total lack of lunar law would likely heighten the
comparison to the Wild West - with no regulation; states would
have an incentive to militarize the Moon and to engage in
prolonged conflicts with other would-be users to gain monopolies
and exclusive uses over valuable lunar resources. While a
scheme rejecting all lunar regulation might lead to an era of free
and open use of the Moon, it also may lead to World War 111.46
In fact, the principal criticism of the Moon Agreement is not that it
proposes regulation, but that it proposes the wrong sort of regulation: the
a considerable period, gained few adherents, none of which are significant space powers." Richard B.
Bilder, A Legal Regime for the Mining of Helium-3 on the Moon: U.S. Policy Options, 33 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 243, 269 (2010).
44. Goedhuis, supra note 24, at 233; see also Nicolas Mateesco Matte, Limited Aerospace
Natural Resources and Their Regulation, 7 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 379, 395 (1982) ('The space
powers should stop offering agreements or treaties which are lacking in substance fata morgana in a
vacuum juris before effective exploitation of limited resources becomes realistic."); Lynn M. Fountain,
Creating Momentum in Space: Ending the Paralysis Produced by the "Common Heritage of Mankind"
Doctrine, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1753 (2003) (noting that the Moon Agreement "deepens the quandary" over
resource ownership because it "defers the resolution of the property rights issue until after an
international governing regime has been established, which is not to be established until exploitation of
the resources becomes feasible. Yet, the ambiguous nature of the governing regime, as well as the
uncertainty of the property rights, discourages such exploitation."); IAN BROWNLtE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 258 (7th ed., 2008) ("[Tlhe [Moon Agreement's] provisions concerning
the appropriation of resources of the moon have certain obscurities.").
45. Hatch, supra note 23, at 267.
46. Id.
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kind that discourages a sufficiently stable and predictable framework
which, in turn, discourages private investment.4 7
Proper regulation would also ensure that there is adequate provision
against any one company acquiring a monopoly position in the world
minerals market, as well as addressing issues of collective security. No one
would deny, for example, that if a huge cache of plutonium were discovered
somewhere outside the Earth, there would be a legitimate regulatory
interest in controlling (or curbing) its use and extraction. To quote one
writer:
A free-market approach bolstered by the legal certainty inherent
in a system that provides defined property rights would do much
to energize the stalled development of the space industry.
Involvement of private companies can provide the focus, money
and research necessary for successful growth. But such growth
must take place under an international regulatory regime. If the
space powers each create and pursue their own legal systems for
the commercialization of outer space, the result will be chaotic
and prone to international conflict.48
Proof of the need for some kind of regulation lies in two pieces of U.S.
legislation. The first is the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR), "a special U.S. regulatory regime aimed at controlling the export
and transfer of U.S. technology, including satellite technology, to foreign
persons."49 The ITAR is not just an explicit recognition of U.S. national
security interests in controlling the transfer of aerospace technology, it is
47. "[P]rivate enterprise ... is not likely to invest without a stable legal environment.... If
political instability threaten[s] financial returns, private enterprise would not make the initial investment.
Without a legal framework to govern extraterrestrial resource development, resources simply would not
be developed. Thus, such a framework is in the interests of mankind." Webber, supra note 16, at 1342;
see also Keefe, supra note 5, at 370 ("Space Law currently . . . lacks a sufficiently well-defined regime
to adequately inform investors of how resources extracted from celestial bodies will be regulated and
divided."); Jeremy L. Zell, Putting a Mine on the Moon: Creating an International Authority to
Regulate Mining Rights in Outer Space, 15 MINN. J. INT'L L. 489, 515 (2006) ("It is nearly impossible
for a firm or nation to calculate potential returns on investment for mining outer space if the legal status
of its claim is unknown. Currently, the debate over the Common Heritage Concept leaves many
debating whether it is possible to make claims on materials in space and who receives the benefits of the
extracted material and in what proportions.").
48. Fountain, supra note 44, at 1775.
49. See RAYMOND G. BENDER, JR., CHAPTER 39 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION-SATELLITE
COMMUNICATIONs: ARBITRATOR PERSPECTIVE § 39.07[3][a], at 39.31; see generally Arms Export
Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-99; International Traffic In Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 120.17
(2010) (limiting export of "any aircraft, vessel, or satellite covered by the U.S. Munitions List, whether
in the United States or abroad").
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also an explicit recognition that the international community has a
legitimate interest in ensuring that sophisticated (and potentially dangerous)
technology does not fall into the wrong hands.
The second is the initial U.S. legislative response to Part XI of the Law
of the Sea Convention (LOSC). Following its rejection of Part XI, the
United States enacted legislation to license and authorize deep sea-bed
mining by U.S. companies.50 Soon thereafter, however, the United States
decided that it could not proceed in a totally unilateral manner and
negotiated separate agreements with its major trading partners "to resolve
overlapping claims with respect to mining areas for polymetallic nodules of
the deep sea-bed." 5' Thus, international cooperation and recognition was
ultimately judged necessary for the resource-exploitation regime to be
viable. Likewise, some form of treaty-based system for technology control
and international exploitation of outer space resources appears desirable.
IV. PRACTICAL PRECEDENTS FOR A FUTURE TREATY SYSTEM
A. The Revised Sea-Bed Regime as Contained in the 1994 Agreement on
Part XT
Since 1979, international law has witnessed four developments that,
together, provide guidance for a reformed Moon Agreement. The most
obvious of these is the sea-bed regime, as now reformulated.
In 1994, shortly prior to the LOSC coming into force,52 the United
States and other Western countries successfully negotiated a new
"Agreement on Implementation" of Part XI. The 1994 Agreement, adopted
by the UN General Assembly in 1994, creates a more market-friendly
regime for the sea-bed.5 3 It reduces the license application fee, abolished
50. See Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553 (1980)
(codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-73).
51. Bilder, supra note 43, at 274; see also id. at 274 n. 117; BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 246;
France-Federal Republic of Germany-United Kingdom-United Sates: Agreement Concerning Interim
Arrangements Relating to Polymetallic Nodules of the Deep Sea Bed, Sept. 2, 1982, 34 U.S.T.S. 3451;
Belgium-France-Federal Republic of Germany-Italy-Japan-Netherlands-United Kingdom-United States:
Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Sea-Bed Matters, Nov. 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1354.
52. The Law of the Sea Convention came into force on November 16, 1994, one year after its
sixtieth ratification.
53. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 42 [hereinafter 1994 Part XI
Agreement]. See generally Marian Nash Leisch, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating
to International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 733 (1994); Cook, supra note 4, at 682-84; Jennifer Frakes,
Notes And Comments: The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and the Deep Seabed, Outer Space,
and Antarctica: Will Developed And Developing Nations Reach A Compromise?, 21 WIS. INT'L L.J.
409, 418-20 (2003); Bilder, supra note 43, at 266-67.
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the requirement that private ventures fund the activities of the so-called
"Enterprise," 54 and abolished mandatory technology transfer requirements55
and mandatory production ceilings. It further provided that voting on the
Sea-Bed Authority would be done in groups, with the United States
virtually guaranteed a seat on such groups, and each group able to block
decisions on substantive matters.57 The 1994 Agreement also established a
Finance Committee that would originate the financial decisions of the ISB
Authority, to which the largest donors would automatically be members and
in which decisions would be made by consensus.s
B. The 1988 Antarctic Mineral Resources Treaty
In 1988, a Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral
Resource Activities (CRAMRA) was signed by the various members of the
Antarctic Treaty System. CRAMRA is aimed to permit and regulate
mining activities in Antarctica. 59 Environmental pressures, however, led to
a shelving of CRAMRA in favor of a long-term moratorium on mineral
activities in the Antarctic, now formalized in the 1991 Madrid Protocol
banning Antarctic mining for fifty years.o
Although CRAMRA had some limited promises of good treatment for
investors willing to mine in the Antarctic, its focus was on administrative
structure. Although it indicated that exploration or development permits
would not be "cancelled" by the council except under certain
61
circumstances, it nevertheless appeared to contemplate that a permit can
be cancelled for any reason with the consent of the investor's "sponsoring
54. 1994 Part XI Agreement, supra note 53, § 2 (abolishing obligations on operators to fund
the Enterprise).
55. Id. Annex § 5 (changing rules regarding technology transfer).
56. Id. Annex § 75 (changing rules regarding production policies, including abolition of
original LOSC rules on production ceilings).
57. Id. Annex § 3.
58. Id. Annex § 9 ("The Finance Committee").
59. Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, 27 I.L.M. 859,
859 (1988) [hereinafter CRAMRA].
60. See Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, art. 7, Oct. 4, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 1499, 1464 (1991).
61. CRAMRA, supra note 59, art. 50(1) ("No Management Scheme shall be suspended or
modified and no Management Scheme, exploration or development permit shall be cancelled without
the consent of the Sponsoring State except pursuant to Article 51 [permitting cancellation where
development goes beyond "acceptable" environmental impact or where operator fails to comply with
Convention], or Article 54 or the Management Scheme itself.").
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State."62 CRAMRA also failed to include specific dispute resolution
procedures or arbitral rights for the investor. A Canadian commentator
remarked that:
Ironically, although the United States feared that the international
regime for sea-bed mining would be used as a model for a new
regime in Antarctica, the Antarctic Minerals Convention of 1988,
approved by the United States, is in many ways more stringent in
its regulations and more complex in its bureaucratic structure.63
C. The ITU System for Regulating Geostationary Orbital Slots
The geostationary orbit "is essentially a doughnut-shaped volume of
space in which geostationary satellites are placed;" and "located
approximately 35,786 kilometers above the Earth's equator."6 Because
such satellites orbit the earth at the same rate as the earth's own rotation,
they "appear motionless when viewed from earth" and thus "can
communicate with approximately one third of the planet, an entire country
or, if in conjunction with a satellite network, the entire globe."65 The
orbital area is a finite space, not only because it is above the equator, but
also because satellites parked too close to each other will interfere with
each others' transmissions.66 Consequently, in order to avoid
overcrowding, a regulatory allocation system is necessary. This exists in
the form of the International Telecommunications Union system (ITU).
An international organization, the ITU "can trace its official existence"
back to 1865.67 Through a 1973 convention, it has power to "effect
allocation of the radio frequency spectrum and registration of radio
62. Id.
63. Louise de La Fayette, Book Review, 86 AM J. INT'L L. 212, 214 n.1 (1992) (reviewing
Markus G. Schmidt, COMMON HERITAGE OR COMMON BURDEN? THE UNITED STATES POSITION ON
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A REGIME FOR DEEP SEA-BED MINING IN THE LAw OF THE SEA CONVENTION
(1989)).
64. Jannat C. Thompson, Space for Rent: The International Telecommunications Union, Space
Law, and Orbit/Spectrum Leasing, 62 J. AIR L. & COM. 279, 283 (1996); see also Lawrence D. Roberts,
A Lost Connection: Geostationary Satellite Networks and the International Telecommunications Union,
15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095, 1101-05 (2000); Fred Kosmo, The Commercialization of Space: A
Regulatory Scheme that Promotes Commercial Ventures and International Responsibility, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1055, 1058-59 (1988).
65. Thompson, supra note 64, at 283; see also Roberts, supra note 64, at 1101-05; Kosmo,
supra note 64, at 1058-59.
66. Thompson, supra note 64, at 285.
67. Roberts, supra note 64, at 1105-06 (discussing history).
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frequency assignments in order to avoid harmful interference between radio
stations of different countries,"68 and can "coordinate efforts to eliminate
harmful interference between radio stations of different countries and to
improve the use made of the radio frequency spectrum." 6 9  The ITU
Convention further provides that "radio frequencies and the geostationary
satellite orbit are limited natural resources," which "must be used
efficiently and economically so that countries or groups of countries may
have equitable access to both."7 o
Acting under this authority, the ITU maintains a master register of
permitted frequencies within which satellites may broadcast;7' thus, acting
as an allocator of geostationary orbit slots. Under its current policy, orbital
positions are "assigned" to states that apply for them. 72 However, states
may "preempt another nation's use of an orbital location" by registering its
intended use of such slots with the ITU. Slots thus operate on a "first
come, first served" basis, giving "preferential treatment to early
registrants."74 The United States and other developed countries have
"consistently opposed any comprehensive plan to share slots and
frequencies, as it is feared that these plans would be inflexible, restrictive,
and result in diminished technical advances."75
Although states may submit disputes over slot allocation to binding
arbitration, 6 collective diplomacy has played a larger role in resolving
controversies. In 1991, for example, Tonga attempted to amass six "slots,"
with the apparent intention of "renting and auctioning" them to other
users.77 Under pressure from INTELSAT and satellite operators, Tonga
68. International Telecommunication Convention, art. 4(2)(a), Oct. 25, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 2497,
2512.
69. Id. art. 4(2)(b).
70. Id. art. 33(27). Article 33 was adopted in 1973 following a similarly worded 1971
resolution by the World Administrative Radio Conference for Space Communications. Susan Cahill,
Give Me My Space: Implications for Permitting National Appropriation of the Geostationary Orbit, 19
Wis. INT'L L.J. 231, 240 (2001). It was amended in 1982 to require the ITU to "take into account" the
needs of "developing countries."
71. Roberts, supra note 64, at 1111-12; Thompson, supra note 64, at 288-90.
72. Cahill, supra note 70, at 233.
73. Id. at 243.
74. Roberts, supra note 64, at 1112-13.
75. Kosmo, supra note 64, at 1062.
76. See Optional Protocol on the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes Relating to the
Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, to the Convention of the International
Telecommunication Union, and to the Administrative Regulations, Dec. 22, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No.
104-34.
77. Cahill, supra note 70, at 244.
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relinquished some of its claims, and ITU regulations were subsequently
amended to require "that a majority of slots applied for be used directly by
the requesting country."78
Although the "common heritage" principle is not an explicit part of the
ITU's regime, the system does work on the assumption that the
geostationary orbit lies outside national sovereignty. This has generated
some controversy in the past. In 1976, a group of equatorial states issued a
declaration (known as the "Bogota Declaration") asserting that "segments"
of the geostationary orbit were "part of the territory over which the
Equatorial States exercise their national sovereignty," and objected to the
ITU system of allocation.7 9 Most space-using nations and scholars have,
however, rejected this claim, on both scientific and legal grounds.80 Legal
scholars have pointed out that a claim of sovereignty over the geostationary
orbit would be incompatible with the Outer Space Treaty's declaration that
outer space "is not subject to national appropriation by claim of
,,81
sovereignty.
Yet despite this controversy, and despite the absence of a centralized
enforcement system (or sanctions system),82 states tend to comply with the
allocation decisions. The ITU system has enabled states (and
corporations) to expend the large amount of resources necessary to build,
launch, and maintain satellites. In that sense, the ITU system can be judged
to be successful.
78. Id.
79. Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries, Dec. 3, 1976 (signed by Brazil,
Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire), reprinted in 2 SPACE LAW: BASIC
LEGAL DOCUMENTS (Prof. Dr. Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Dr. Mariette Benko & Prof. Dr. Stephan Hobe
eds., 2005).
80. See Thompson, supra note 64, at 308 (noting that the BogotA Declaration was
"overwhelming[ly] reject[ed]"). From a scientific perspective, scholars commented that: (1) from a
functional perspective, the geostationary orbit is part of outer space; and (2) the geostationary orbit is
not, as the Bogoth Declaration states asserted, created by the gravitational pull of the earth beneath it.
Kosmo, supra note 64, at 1061.
81. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. 11.
82. It has been said that, if the ITU "can be comparable to a traffic officer, it is an officer
unable to adequately measure the traffic, whose 'tickets' for violations are often ignored and who lacks
not only a jail but also a court for offenders." Thompson, supra note 64, at 290 (quoting David M.
Leive, International Telecommunications and International Law: The Regulation of the Radio
Spectrum, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L., at 22 n.8 (1970)).
83. Thompson, supra note 64, at 290.
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1. The Space Station Agreement
Under the Intergovernmental Agreement on the International Space
Station (IGA), participating states can contribute towards the building and
establishment of the International Space Station (ISS).8 The ISS has been
described as a "hub and spoke structure" with NASA, the operator of the
ISS, at the "hub.,s Once operational, "modules" of the ISS are treated as
being subject to the sovereignty and control of a given participating state.86
Thus, research and development activities being conducted within, say, a
Russian module can be treated as being subject to Russian law (including,
where applicable, Russian patent and intellectual property law). The
participating state (and/or those operating within its module), therefore, has
legal security over any developments or discoveries they may make while
using the ISS.
2. Investment Protection Treaties and Free Trade Agreements
The third, and perhaps most significant, trend of international law
since the 1980s has been the emergence of modern "bilateral investment
treaties" (BITs) and similar multilateral treaties, which typically contain
both substantive and procedural protections for an investment. These
treaties guarantee that an investment will not be "expropriated" (i.e.,
confiscated) without payment of prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation. They also provide a variety of further protections,
84. See Agreement among the Government of Canada, Governments of Member States of the
European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of the Russian Federation, and the
Government of the United States of America concerning cooperation on the Civil International Space
Station, Jan. 29, 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 12927 [hereinafter IGA Agreement].
85. Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights: From the Earth to the
Stars, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 23, 37 (2005).
86. See IGA Agreement, supra note 84, art. 21(2) ("[F]or purposes of intellectual property
law, an activity occurring in or on a Space Station flight element shall be deemed to have occurred only
in the territory of the Partner State of that element's registry, except that for ESA-registered elements
any European Partner State may deem the activity to have occurred within its territory.") (emphasis
added).
87. See, e.g., Model Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments
for Kingdom of the Netherlands, art. 6, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/
dite/iialdocs/Compendium//en/135%20volume%205.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter
Netherlands Model BIT] (restricting state's power to nationalize investments except "in the public
interest and under due process of law," in a manner that is non-discriminatory and not contrary to prior
state undertakings, and that provides for "just compensation" representing the "genuine value" of the
investment); Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, art. 5, Dec. 11, 1990, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/
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including that investors will receive "fair and equitable treatment," 8 which
has been described as embodying principles of "transparency, stability and
the investor's legitimate expectations, compliance with contractual
obligations, procedural propriety and due process, action in good faith and
freedom from coercion and harassment."89  BITs often provide that
investors shall not be discriminated against on the grounds of nationality
and/or will receive "most favored nation" treatment, i.e., the same level of
treatment as the most favorable investment treaties entered into by the host
state. 90 BITs also typically provide for arbitration before the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or under the
arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL).91
bits/uk argentina.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter UK-Argentina BIT] (similar restrictions;
requiring for "prompt, adequate and effective compensation" in the event of expropriation); Energy
Charter Treaty, art. 13(1), Dec. 12, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 360 (similar restrictions; requiring payment of "fair
market value of the Investment expropriated at the time immediately before the Expropriation or
impending Expropriation became known in such a way as to affect the value of the Investment")
[hereinafter Energy Charter Treaty]; Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, art. 6(1) (2004 Model BIT), available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iialdocs/
Compendium//en/model USA.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT] (similar
restrictions and guarantees of "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation).
88. See, e.g., Netherlands Model BIT, supra note 87, art. 3(1) (providing that investments of
investors shall be accorded "fair and equitable treatment" and that such investments shall not be
"impair[ed] by unreasonable or discriminatory measures"); UK-Argentina BIT, supra note 87, art. 2(2)
(investors shall receive "fair and equitable treatment" and also guarantees against "unreasonable or
discriminatory measures"); accord Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 87, art. 10(1). The current U.S.
Model BIT likewise provides for "fair and equitable treatment," but clarifies that this is intended to be
co-extensive with the minimum standards of treatment of foreign nationals required under customary
international law. See also U.S. Model BIT, supra note 87, art. 5(l)-(2).
89. Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment, Protection of Foreign Investments
Through Modern Treaty Arbitration-Diversity and Harmonisation, ASA SPECIAL SERIES No. 34, at
126 (Anne K. Hoffmann ed., May 2010). As contained in the Netherlands Model BIT, this has been
interpreted as entitling investors to expect "that the [host state] will not act in a way that is manifestly
inconsistent, non-transparent, unreasonable (i.e., unrelated to some rational policy), or discriminatory
(i.e., based on unjustifiable distinctions)." Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award,
309 (UNCITRAL Mar. 17, 2006).
90. See, e.g., Netherlands Model BIT, supra note 87, art. 3(2) ("Each Contracting Party shall
accorded to [foreign] investments treatment which in any case shall not be less favorable than that
accord either to investments of its own nationals or to investments of nationals of any third State,
whichever is more favourable to the national concerned."); UK-Argentina BIT, supra note 87, art. 3
(guaranteeing national treatment and MFN treatment); Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 87, art. 10(3)
(similar); U.S. Model BIT, supra note 87, arts. 3-4 (national and MFN treatment).
91. See, e.g., Netherlands Model BIT, supra note 87, art. 9 (providing for ICSID arbitration of
investment disputes); UK-Argentina BIT, supra note 87, art. 8 (providing for ICSID or UNCITRAL
arbitration of investor-state disputes); Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 87, art. 26 (providing for
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The guiding principles behind investor protection were aptly
summarized in the 2003 award of the Tecmed tribunal:
The foreign investor expects the State to act in a consistent
manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its
relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know
beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its
investment, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and
administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its
investment and comply with such regulations. The foreign
investor also expects the host State to act consistently, i.e.,
without arbitrarily revoking any preexisting decisions or permits
issued by the State that were relied upon by the investor to
assume its commitment as well as to plan and launch its
commercial and business activities. The investor also expects the
State to use the legal instruments that govern the actions of the
investor or the investment in conformity with the function
usually assigned to such instruments, and not to deprive the
investor of its investment without the required compensation.
Another form of investment protection is a "concession" agreement
between the host state and the investor.93 Such agreements have sometimes
been expressed (or construed) as being subject to the general principle of
pacta sunt servanda, meaning that the obligations arising thereunder must
be performed in good faith and cannot be abrogated by later state action.94
These protections are usually enforceable in a neutral arbitral forum
pursuant to the rules of a neutral legal system; "the investor priority will be
the choice of a legal order that provides a stable and predictable legal
ICSID, UNCITRAL, or Stockholm Chamber of Commerce arbitration of investor-state disputes); U.S.
Model BIT, supra note 87, art. 24 (providing for ICSID or UNCITRAL).
92. T6cnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexico, No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, 1 154
(ICSID May 29, 2003).
93. See generally RUDoLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 72-79 (2008) (chapter on investment contracts). Concession agreements sometimes
include a "stabilization clause," in which the host state promises not to alter or vary the regulatory or
taxation environment in a manner that would alter the investment climate. See id. at 75.
94. Thus, in the Lena Goldfields arbitration, a concession between a foreign firm and the
Soviet Government was construed as being governed by "general principles" of law, including pacta
sunt servanda-not merely domestic Soviet law. See Arthur Nussbaum, The Arbitration Between the
Lena Goldfields, Ltd. and the Soviet Government, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 31, 35-36 (1950); see also V.V.
Veeder, The Lena Goldfields Arbitration: The Historical Roots of Three Ideas, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
747, 750 (1998); Sapphire Int'l Petroleums Ltd. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., Arbitral Award, 35 I.L.R. 136,
187-88 (Mar. 15, 1963) (An arbitrator likewise interpreted a state concession, whose terms were
expressly governed by "general principles of law," not Iranian law, to be governed by the fundamental
rule of pacta sunt servanda.). Id. at 181-83.
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environment and of a forum for dispute resolution that will preclude bias or
political influence against the investor."95
V. POSSIBLE INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW MOON AGREEMENT
With those examples in mind, here are some basic provisions that
should be included in any future regime governing extraterrestrial
development:
1. Ability to Prospect/Explore: LOSC and CRAMRA both
give operators the ability to prospect or explore a particular
area for resources as a preliminary to engaging full mining
activity in that area. This is a basic prerequisite for private
mining.
2. Ability to Mine: Once prospected, an operator should then
have the ability to mine as per an approved fine, subject to
compliance with environmental and safety requirements.
This too is a feature of both LOSC and CRAMRA.9 7
3. Property Rights in Extracted Materials: The rules should
make clear, from the outset, that the operator has good title
to the minerals it extracts, just as LOSC states that "title to
minerals shall pass upon recovery in accordance with this
Convention."98
4. Length of Tenure: Mining is a long-term investment.
LOSC provides, for example, that an operator will have. a
fifteen year contract.99
5. Transparency: Where an investor is subject to a regulated
regime, it ideally is entitled to full transparency in the form
of advance knowledge of any and all applicable rules,
practices, and policies of the regulator. This is now
reflected in the new transparency provisions of the 2004
U.S. Model BIT. 00
95. Id. at 174.
96. See LOSC, supra note 7, Annex III arts. 2-3; CRAMRA supra note 59, arts. 37-39.
97. See LOSC, supra note 7, Annex III art. 6 ("Approval of plans of work"); CRAMRA supra
note 59, art. 48 (providing that a regulatory committee has power to grant operators the "exclusive
rights" to "explore" and "develop the mineral resource or resources which are the subject of the
Management Scheme exclusively in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Management
Scheme").
98. LOSC, supra note 7, Annex III § 1.
99. Id. Annex I § 1(1).
100. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 87, art. II (requiring transparency in, inter alia, regulatory
measures and administrative proceedings).
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6. Security of Tenure: As the late Professor Thomas Wllde
stated, an investor "should be protected against unexpected
and detrimental changes of policy if the investor has carried
out significant investment with a reasonable, public-
authority initiated assurance in the stability of such
policy." 0  Concession agreements, thus, sometimes
include "stability clauses" which protect against ex post
facto changes to the regulatory framework, and guarantee
pacta sunt servanda. Many BITs require that a state shall
observe any express commitments it has made with respect
to an investment (e.g., in the form of a prior contract). 0  At
present, the ITU system likewise provides effective security
of tenure once an orbital slot is allocated, but a mining
regime would probably require more explicit guarantees.
7. Right to Repatriation of Capital and/or Dividends: Most
BITs contain some kind of guarantee that the investor will
be able to realize its investment by repatriating its capital
and dividends. 0 3
8. Control over Management: Many BITs provide investors
with a measure of freedom in selecting senior
management.
9. Intellectual Property: It can be expected that technological
discoveries and innovations will be developed not just in
the home state's laboratory, but on-site. Using the model
from the IGA for the ISS, operators should be permitted to
101. Int'l Thunderbird Gaming, Inc. v. Mexico, Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Wailde, 30
(UNCITRAL Jan. 26, 2006).
102. See, e.g., Netherlands Model BIT, supra note 87, art. 3(4) ("Each Contracting Party shall
observe any obligation it may have entered into with respect to investments of nationals of the other
Contracting Party."); UK-Argentina BIT, supra note 87, art. 2(2) (same); Energy Charter Treaty, supra
note 87, art. 10(1) (similar).
103. See, e.g., Netherlands Model BIT, supra note 87, art. 5 ("The Contracting Parties shall
guarantee that payments relating to an investment [including profits, loan repayments, earnings, and the
proceeds of sale or liquidation of the investment] may be transferred."); UK-Argentina BIT, supra note
87, art. 6(1) (providing for repatriation of "investments and retum"); Energy Charter Treaty, supra note
87, art. 14 (providing for protection of certain "transfers" relating to investments); U.S. Model BIT,
supra note 87, art. 7 (protection of certain "transfers").
104. See, e.g., Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 87, art. 11(2) ("A Contracting Party shall
permit Investors of another Contracting Party which have Investments in its Area, and Investments of
such Investors, to employ any key person of the Investor's or the Investment's choice regardless of
nationality and citizenship provided that such key person has been permitted to enter, stay and work in
the Area of the former Contracting Party and that the employment concerned conforms to the terms,
conditions and time limits of the permission granted to such key person."); U.S. Model BIT, supra note
87, art. 9 (Host states may not insist that "senior management" of an enterprise possess a "particular
nationality.").
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claim intellectual property rights arising from such
discoveries.
10. Full Protection and Security: BITs typically provide that an
investor will receive a certain minimum level of protection
from the host government. 05 Although this does not
translate directly into the space context, the future regime
might require that member states operating in proximity to
the investor shall not infringe upon the operator's physical
security.
11. Neutral Forum: An adequately functioning regime must
provide for neutral dispute resolution in a forum in which
all parties have confidence, pursuant to a neutral system of
law. Although the ITU system and the LOSC sea-bed
arrangements have attempted to create such an
arrangement, the BIT arbitration system, operating under
the ICSID or the UNCITRAL rules, offers the best known
model for resolving disputes between a private actor and a
public host state/regulator. Arbitration is also established as
a "preferred method of resolving industry disputes" within
the commercial aerospace community.106
VI. CONCLUSION
Although it may take some time for exploration of the Moon or other
celestial bodies to resume in earnest, and still more time to develop means
of exploiting their natural resources, the policy issues presented by the
Moon Agreement still warrant close study. This is particularly true for the
companies whose technology might one day play a role in that process.
If and when the technology to develop the Moon is eventually
developed, the shortcomings of the Moon Agreement will have to be
addressed. If, as now seems likely, the Moon Agreement proves to be an
unworkable model for regulation, it will either wither on the vine due to
lack of signatures, or else undergo a major revision. When that occurs, the
105. See, e.g., Netherlands Model BIT, supra note 87, art. 3(1) ("Each contracting party shall
accord to [foreign] investments full physical security and protection."); UK-Argentina BIT, supra note
87, art. 2(2) (similar provision); Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 87, art. 10(1) (similar); U.S. Model
BIT, supra note 87, arts. 5(l)-(2) (similar; clarifying that the "full protection and security" standard
requires host states "to provide the level of police protection required under customary international
law").
106. BENDER, supra note 49, § 39.01 at 39.2; see also id. § 39.04[l] at 39.19 (explaining that
arbitration is preferred because of its "significant advantages," including its perceived fairness, that it
allows for the appointment skilled arbitrators with technical knowledge and industry experience, and
that it can protect technical and confidential business data).
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lessons of other areas of international law, including investment law, are
sure to be instructive.
